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INSECURE COMMUNITIES: HOW AN 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM 
ENCOURAGES BATTERED WOMEN  
TO STAY SILENT 
Radha Vishnuvajjala* 
Abstract: Domestic violence is a pervasive problem in American society. 
Undocumented immigrant women suffer disproportionately from spousal 
abuse due to language and cultural barriers. Undocumented domestic vio-
lence victims often do not know how or where to seek help and fear de-
portation. That fear is not unfounded because Secure Communities, an 
immigration enforcement program run by Immigration and Customs En-
forcement, requires participating local law enforcement agencies to cross-
check fingerprints with a federal immigration database. Individuals that 
are matched and considered removable are subject to removal proceed-
ings. Secure Communities makes undocumented immigrant women less 
likely to call for help because of the risk of being fingerprinted and then 
deported. This Note argues for a three-step process to provide protection 
for victims of domestic violence. 
Introduction 
 When Maria Bolanos called the police during a fight with her 
partner, she never imagined that a call for help could lead to her own 
deportation.1 A police officer responded to the call from the twenty-
eight-year-old Salvadoran undocumented immigrant, but ended up 
charging her with illegally selling a phone card to a neighbor.2 The po-
lice later dropped the charge, but not before fingerprinting Bolanos.3 
Under the Secure Communities program, officers cross-referenced her 
fingerprints with a federal immigration database maintained by Immi-
                                                                                                                      
* Articles Editor, Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice (2011–2012). 
1 Shankar Vedantam, Destined for Deportation? Salvadoran Woman Targeted by Program De-
signed to Catch Undocumented Criminals, Wash. Post, Nov. 1, 2010, at B1. 
2 Id.; Erin Pangilinan, Domestic Violence Victim Calls Out ICE Assistant Director on her Deporta-
tion, Change.org (Nov. 29, 2010), http://news.change.org/stories/domestic-violence-victim-
calls-out-ice-assistant-director-on-her-deportation. 
3 Vedantam, supra note 1. 
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gration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).4 Because Bolanos had been 
previously fingerprinted after customs officials caught her illegally en-
tering the United States, she was flagged for deportation.5 
 Secure Communities was designed to improve public safety by 
identifying and removing criminal aliens.6 ICE claims that Secure 
Communities “prioritiz[es] the removal of criminal aliens, those who 
pose a threat to public safety, and repeat immigration violators,” but 
Bolanos’ current predicament may prove otherwise.7 Even though po-
lice later dropped the phone card charge, Bolanos’ fingerprints were 
the first step toward deportation proceedings.8 Bolanos’ story demon-
strates how Secure Communities not only removes dangerous criminals 
from communities, but also is used as a widespread immigration en-
forcement tool.9 
 Using Secured Communities as a broad enforcement mechanism 
undermines the relationship between undocumented immigrants and 
local law enforcement by making victims of crime hesitant to ask for 
help.10 In instances of domestic violence, the risk of contacting the po-
lice is further compounded by barriers of language, culture, and de-
pendency on documented, abusive partners.11 Undocumented domes-
                                                                                                                      
 
4 Id.; Erin Pangilinan, Mother Battles Secure Communities and Deportation, Change.org 
(Dec. 29, 2010),http://news.change.org/stories/mother-battles-secure-communities-and-
deportation. 
5 Vedantam, supra note 1. 
6 See id.; Secure Communities, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement, http://www.ice. 
gov/secure_communities (last visited Nov. 1, 2011). 
7 Secure Communities, supra note 6; see Vedantam, supra note 1. 
8 Vedantam, supra note 1. 
9 See id. 
10 See Katerina Shaw, Note, Barriers to Freedom: Continued Failure of U.S. Immigration Laws 
to Offer Equal Protection to Immigrant Battered Women, 15 Cardozo J.L. & Gender 663, 678 
(2009); Sarah M. Wood, Note, VAWA’s Unfinished Business: The Immigrant Women Who Fall 
Through the Cracks, 11 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 141, 151–52 (2004); Vedantam, supra 
note 1. Strong relationships between police officers and the communities they are in 
charge of protecting are necessary for effective law enforcement. See Jason G. Idilbi, Local 
Enforcement of Federal Immigration Law: Should North Carolina Communities Implement 287(g) 
Authority?, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1710, 1728–29 (2008). Not only does the community depend on 
the police for protection, but the police depend on the community to report crimes and 
serve as witnesses. Id. at 1728; see David Hench, Building Trust vs. Checking for Visas: Making 
Police Enforce Immigration Laws Could Actually Detract from Crime Fighting, Some Officials Say, 
Portland Press Herald, Mar. 29, 2004, at 1B. 
11 See Lee J. Teran, Barriers to Protection at Home and Abroad: Mexican Victims of Domestic 
Violence and the Violence Against Women Act, 17 B.U. Int’l L.J. 1, 12 (1999). One study indi-
cated that among immigrant Latina women in Washington, D.C., seventy-seven percent 
were victims of abuse. Id.; see H.R. Rep. No. 103-395, at 26–27 (1993). Immigrant women, 
and especially undocumented women, are at particular risk for violence because they al-
ready face language and cultural barriers to receiving social services. Teran, supra, at 12; see 
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tic violence victims—mostly women—are less likely to report abuse than 
documented or non-immigrant victims because they fear being reported 
to immigration authorities.12 Undocumented women are especially vul-
nerable when their abusive partners are documented because a docu-
mented abuser has no fear of deportation and therefore has another 
element of power.13 Abusers may exert their control by threatening de-
portation or blocking their victims from obtaining lawful status.14 
 This Note argues that Secure Communities should only cross-
check fingerprints of those accused of serious crimes, thereby preserv-
ing the relationship between police and undocumented victims of do-
mestic violence.15 Part I describes the problem of domestic violence 
                                                                                                                      
 
Leslye E. Orloff et al., With No Place to Turn: Improving Legal Advocacy for Battered Immigrant 
Women, 29 Fam. L.Q. 313, 316–17 (1995); Susan Girardo Roy, Note, Restoring Hope or Tolerat-
ing Abuse? Responses to Domestic Violence Against Immigrant Women, 9 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 263, 
267 (1995) (citing Christine Whalen & Martha King, Abuse in a New Land: Immigrant Wives 
Often Isolated, Vulnerable, Seattle Times, Aug. 8, 1994, at A1). Undocumented women are 
especially deterred from seeking help from law enforcement because they lack “the legal 
status or the employment authorization necessary to support themselves and their chil-
dren.” Teran, supra, at 12; accord H. Rep. No. 103-395, at 26–27. Undocumented women 
also face threats of deportation from their partners and loss of child custody, making them 
less likely to seek help from law enforcement regarding an abusive partner. Teran, supra, at 
12; see H.R. Rep. No. 103-395, supra, at 26–27. 
12 Molly Dragiewicz & Yvonne Lindgren, The Gendered Nature of Domestic Violence: Statisti-
cal Data for Lawyers Considering Equal Protection Analysis, 17 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & 
L. 229, 256 (2009); Mary Ann Dutton et al., Characteristics of Help-Seeking Behaviors, Resources 
and Service Needs of Battered Immigrant Latinas: Legal and Policy Implications, 7 Geo. J. on Pov-
erty L. & Pol'y 245, 293 (2000); Nat Stern & Karen Oehme, Increasing Safety for Battered 
Women and Their Children: Creating a Privilege for Supervised Visitation Intake Records, 41 U. 
Rich. L. Rev. 499, 501 n.11 (2007); Teran, supra note 11, at 12; Shaw, supra note 10, at 678; 
Juliette Terzieff, More Services Reach Abused Immigrant Women, Women’s eNews, 1, 3 (Aug. 
11, 2005), http://www.ncdsv.org/images/moreservicesreachabuseimmigrantwomen.pdf. 
In one study, sixty-five percent of battered immigrant women reported that their batterer 
had threatened them with deportation. Shaw, supra note 10, at 666; see Giselle Aguilar Hass 
et al., Battered Immigrants and U.S. Citizen Spouses, Legal Momentum, 1, 3 (Apr. 24, 2006), 
http://www.legalmomentum.org/assets/pdfs/wwwbatteredimmsanduscspouses.pdf. 
13 See Teran, supra note 11, at 12. If the man is documented and the woman is not, she 
may perceive him to be less resistant to calling immigration authorities because he would 
have no fear of deportation himself. See Hass et al., supra note 12, at 3–4. 
14 Idilbi, supra note 10, at 1732 n.125; Hass et al., supra note 12, at 3; see Gail Pendleton, 
Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws and Its Effects on Victims of Domestic Violence, A.B.A. 
Commission on Domestic Violence, 1, 1, http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/le- 
gal_archives/Archive_Local%20Enforcement%20and%20Domestic%20Violence-1.doc (last vis-
ited Sept. 26, 2011). 
15 This Note focuses on domestic violence in heterosexual relationships, where women 
tend to be victims and men their abusers. This is not always the case, but studies show that 
women are at greater risk of violence from male partners than men are from their female 
partners. Dragiewicz & Lindgren, supra note 12, at 256; Stern & Oehme, supra note 12, at 501 
n.11. There are relatively few cases involving men as victims with women as perpetrators and, 
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against undocumented immigrants, the importance of trust between 
law enforcement and the immigrant community, and language barriers 
that immigrants face in seeking assistance. Part II describes the Secure 
Communities program, including the history of collaboration between 
local and federal law enforcement and the impetus for the program. 
Finally, part III argues that ICE must decisively reform the Secure 
Communities program to protect those victims of domestic violence by 
using a proposed three-step process. 
I. Domestic Violence, Undocumented Immigrants,  
and Local Law Enforcement 
 Undocumented women face barriers in the form of society at 
large, the culture and customs of their native countries, and often times 
their inability to communicate effectively in the English language.16 
These barriers can create a rift between law enforcement officials and 
the undocumented immigrant community that they serve.17 These fac-
tors, in combination with a fear of deportation, make undocumented 
women reluctant to ask for help.18 
A. Domestic Violence Perpetrated Against Immigrant Women 
 Immigrants, especially those perceived to be undocumented, are 
frequently victims of crime.19 Undocumented immigrants are easy prey 
                                                                                                                      
in those cases, “much of female violence is committed in self-defense and inflicts less injury 
than male violence.” Stern & Oehme, supra note 12, at 502 n.11; accord Dragiewicz & 
Lindgren, supra note 12, at 256. 
16 See Karin Wang, Battered Asian American Women: Community Responses from the Battered 
Women’s Movement and the Asian American Community, 3 Asian L.J. 151, 162–63 (1996); Shaw, 
supra note 10, at 665; Wood, supra note 10, at 150–52; see Idilbi, supra note 10, at 1728–29. 
17 See Wang, supra note 16, at 162–63. 
18 See Dutton et al., supra note 12, at 293; Idilbi, supra note 10, at 1728–29. 
19 Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91 
Iowa L. Rev. 1449, 1450–55 (2006); Christopher Carlberg, Note, Cooperative Noncooperation: 
A Proposal for an Effective Uniform Noncooperation Immigration Policy for Local Governments, 77 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 740, 748 (2009); Wang, supra note 16, at 162–63; Shaw, supra note 10, 
at 665; Wood, supra note 10 at 150–52; see, e.g., Matt Hughes, Leaders: Learn from Hate, 
Times Leader, Jan. 29, 2011, at 1A (describing the 2008 beating that led to the death of an 
undocumented Mexican immigrant); Sarah Netter, Hating Hispanics: Has Arizona Ignited 
Firestorm After Decade of Simmering Tension?, ABC News ( July 19, 2010), http://abcnews. 
go.com/US/hating-hispanics-arizona-ignited-firestorm-decade-simmering-tension/story?id 
=11179708; Staten Island Teen to Serve Time for Attack on Mexican Immigrant, NY1 News, 
http://www.ny1.com/content/top_stories/134218/staten-island-teen-to-serve-time-for-attack- 
on-mexican-immigrant (last updated Feb. 18, 2011, 5:44PM). 
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because they are reluctant to report crimes to police.20 Therefore, 
criminals perceive them as having no source of protection and they are 
likely to be repeatedly victimized.21 
 This police-averse mentality also enters the home, where domestic 
violence against undocumented immigrants often goes unreported and 
unresolved.22 Domestic violence is an increasingly pervasive problem in 
American society— “a woman is assaulted by her partner every fifteen 
seconds and each year 1500 women are killed as a result of domestic 
violence.”23 These numbers, however, only reflect reported domestic 
violence incidents.24 
 Domestic violence statistics show a stark divide when examined by 
immigration status.25 Immigrant women are the most vulnerable group 
among victims of domestic violence.26 Estimates show that nearly sixty 
percent of married immigrant women are in abusive relationships.27 
They are also less likely to report abuse than documented or non-
immigrant women.28 While fifty-five percent of all domestic violence 
victims report their abuse to law enforcement officials, only thirty per-
                                                                                                                      
20 Kittrie, supra note 19, at 1451–52; Carlberg, supra note 19, at 748. 
21 See Carlberg, supra note 19, at 748–49. 
22 See id.; see, e.g., Laura Jontz, Note, Eighth Circuit to Battered Kenyan: Take a Safari—
Battered Immigrants Face New Barrier When Reporting Domestic Violence, 55 Drake L. Rev. 195, 
196 (2006). 
23 Jontz, supra note 22, at 196–97. 
24 Id. According to one 2009 report, twenty-seven percent of domestic violence victims 
in the prior year did not report the incident to police. Ramsey Hanafi, Over One-Fourth of 
Domestic Violence Incidents Go Unreported, Legal Match (Apr. 22, 2009), http://lawblog. 
legalmatch.com/2009/04/22/over-one-fourth-of-domestic-violence-incidents-go-unreported. 
Accurate statistics, however, are difficult to obtain. See C. J. Newton, Domestic Violence Statis-
tics: Prevalence and Trends, FindCounseling.com (Feb. 2001), http://www.findcounseling. 
com/journal/domestic-violence/domestic-violence-statistics.html. 
The precise incidence of domestic violence in America is difficult to deter-
mine for several reasons: it often goes unreported, even on surveys; there is 
no nationwide organization that gathers information from local police de-
partments about the number of substantiated reports and calls; and there is 
disagreement about what should be included in the definition of domestic 
violence. “One study estimated that more than 3% (approximately 1.8 mil-
lion) of women were severely assaulted by male partners or cohabitants over 
the course of a year, while other studies indicate the percentage of women 
experiencing dating violence . . . ranges as high as 65%. 
Id. (quoting Joy D. Osofsky, The Impact of Violence on Children, 9 Future of Child., Winter 
1999, at 33, 34). 
25 See Shaw, supra note 10, at 663. 
26 Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625, 
1696 (2007); Shaw, supra note 10, at 663; see Hass et al., supra note 12, at 3. 
27 Jontz, supra note 22, at 197. 
28 Shaw, supra note 10, at 678. 
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cent of documented immigrants turn to law enforcement for help and 
the number drops to fourteen percent for undocumented women.29 
Many undocumented victims indicate that fear of being reported to 
immigration authorities is one of their primary reasons for remaining 
in an abusive relationship.30 
1. Social Barriers 
 Abusive partners often tend to socially isolate their undocumented 
victims from society.31 An undocumented woman is especially vulner-
able when her abusive partner is documented because her immigration 
status then becomes another form of leverage that abuser may use to 
isolate her.32 Abusers frequently exploit their partners’ immigration 
status to exert further control by threatening deportation or creating 
barriers during victims’ attempts to gain lawful status.33 Undocumented 
victims may then feel reliant on abusers, especially when American laws 
are difficult to comprehend and victims do not know of, understand, or 
trust legal aid programs.34 
 Abusers often prohibit contact with friends and family or forbid the 
victim to work or attend school.35 Isolation furthers domestic violence 
because the undocumented victim is cut off from potential sources of 
support and assistance.36 For example, a woman named Luisa came to 
the United States illegally from Mexico.37 She initially had the support 
of her friends and family, but this changed after she married her hus-
                                                                                                                      
29 Id. 
30 Dutton et al., supra note 12, at 293 (stating that 21.7% of the surveyed battered im-
migrant women listed fear of being reported to immigration officials as one of their pri-
mary reasons for remaining in the abusive relationship). 
31 See Margot Mendelson, The Legal Production of Identities: A Narrative Analysis of Conver-
sations with Battered Undocumented Women, 19 Berkeley Women’s L.J. 138, 163 (2004). 
32 See Shaw, supra note 10, at 665. 
33 Hass et al., supra note 12, at 3. 
34 Mendelson, supra note 31, at 183. This lack of education tends to persist until a 
woman receives legal status because many undocumented women are too afraid to enroll 
in school and feel uncomfortable dealing with people outside their homes. Id. The legal 
system, and immigration law in particular, is very complex. Linda Kelly Hill, The Right to Be 
Heard: Voicing the Due Process Right to Counsel for Unaccompanied Alien Children, 31 B.C. Third 
World L.J. 41, 62 (2011). This complexity seriously undermines the ability of unrepre-
sented individuals to navigate the system. Id. When litigants must rely on attorneys, immi-
grants who do not speak English are at an even greater disadvantage than other unrepre-
sented persons. See id. 
35 Leslye E. Orloff et al., Battered Immigrant Women’s Willingness to Call for Help and Police 
Response, 13 UCLA Women’s L.J. 43, 81 (2003); see Shaw, supra note 10, at 665. 
36 Orloff et al., supra note 35, at 81. 
37 Mendelson, supra note 31, at 163. 
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band, who was a U.S. citizen.38 He became abusive and possessive, caus-
ing her to feel isolated from the community and unable to seek help.39 
 Although abuse initially causes the isolation, friends and family 
may worsen a situation by warning victims not to leave abusive partners 
because life would be too hard as a single, undocumented immigrant.40 
For example, another undocumented and abused woman, Leticia, 
found herself in a social network comprised entirely of her husband’s 
friends and relatives with no support of her own.41 Her mother-in-law 
exacerbated the situation by threatening to call the police and have her 
deported if she complained about her husband’s violence.42 
 An undocumented immigrant from El Salvador was so desperate 
to leave her abusive boyfriend that she tried to jump out of a moving 
car.43 He then grabbed her and beat her in the street, but she never 
reported the incident because of her illegal status.44 One undocu-
mented woman from Mexico married a U.S. citizen and spent five years 
in an abusive relationship with him.45 Her husband repeatedly raped 
her and even threatened to kill their two children, but she failed to re-
port the abuse in fear of deportation.46 Without support outside of 
abusive relationships, many undocumented victims remain unaware 
that domestic violence is a crime in the United States or that there are 
services available.47 
2. Cultural Barriers 
 In addition to the social barriers that isolate undocumented do-
mestic violence victims, there are also cultural barriers—norms and cus-
toms—that discourage women from standing up to domestic violence.48 
 In many Asian cultures, society is centered around groups.49 Fami-
lies are the most important social units, and members of many Asian 
communities are expected to put the needs of the family above their 
                                                                                                                      
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 164–65. 
41 Id. at 164. 
42 Mendelson, supra note 31, at 164. 
43 Jontz, supra note 22, at 196. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 See, e.g., Wang, supra note 16, at 162–63. 
48 See id. at 168–72; Wood, supra note 10, at 151–52. 
49 Wang, supra note 16, at 168. 
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own.50 Traditionally, many Asian cultures consider women secondary to 
men, as evidenced by marriage customs.51 Women would stay at home 
while men worked to support the family, thereby merging a woman’s 
identity with that of her family.52 
 When this subordinate role persists in modern times, women may 
be reluctant to break out of the traditional family unit in an effort to 
stop domestic violence.53 These norms make women feel that they 
must protect the family reputation at their own expense because one 
family member’s guilt or shame extends to the rest of the family.54 One 
example of this strong sense of family reputation is the story of Kim 
Seng, a Cambodian woman murdered by her abusive husband.55 Just 
one week before the murder, Seng’s family organized an intervention 
to ask her husband to stop his beatings and encourage them to stay to-
gether.56 Seng’s mother later admitted, “‘I didn’t sense the danger be-
cause I was so focused on the shame my daughter’s actions would bring 
in the Cambodian community’ . . . .  ‘And I was thinking about my 
daughter’s children and the importance of their having a family.’”57 
This same family-centric culture precludes the option of divorce be-
cause it would break up the family unit and bring shame to the family.58 
                                                                                                                      
50 Evelyn Lee, Overview: The Assessment and Treatment of Asian American Families, in 
Working with Asian Americans: A Guide for Clinicians 7 (Evelyn Lee ed., 1997); Tam 
B. Tran, Using DSM-IV to Diagnose Mental Illness in Asian Americans, 10 J. Contemp. Legal 
Issues 335, 342–43 (1999); Wang, supra note 16, at 168–69; see Carolyn Jin-Myung Oh, 
Questioning the Cultural and Gender-Based Assumptions of the Adversary System: Voices of Asian-
American Law Students, 7 Berkeley Women’s L.J. 125, 167 (1992). 
51 Wang, supra note 16, at 169. In many Asian cultures, marriages “were frequently pre-
arranged [and] often involved an exchange of money from the groom’s family to the 
bride’s family,” much like in a sale, indicating that the wife would be subject to the will of 
the husband. Id.; see Christine K. Ho, An Analysis of Domestic Violence in Asian American Com-
munities: A Multicultural Approach to Counseling, 9 Women & Therapy 129, 131 (1990). Al-
though these traditions seem outdated, they still exist to some extent in modern times in 
the United States. See Ho, supra, at 136–37; Wang, supra note 16, at 169 n.105. “In a study 
in Seattle on domestic violence, Vietnamese men expressed a sense of ownership over 
their wives and Vietnamese, Laotian, and Khmer women all said that they could not refuse 
their husbands’ requests for sex without a good excuse.” Wang, supra note 16, at 169 n.105; 
see Ho, supra, at 141. 
52 Nilda Rimonte, A Question of Culture: Cultural Approval of Violence Against Women in the 
Pacific-Asian Community and the Cultural Defense, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 1311, 1318 (1991); Wang, 
supra note 16, at 169. 
53 Wang, supra note 16, at 169–72. 
54 Ho, supra note 51, at 134; Wang, supra note 16, at 169. 
55 Geeta Anand, Mother’s Regret Raises Abuse Issue, Bos. Globe, May 8, 1994, at 29. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 See Wang, supra note 16, at 170. 
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 Similarly powerful social norms about how a wife and mother 
should behave exist in the Latino immigrant community.59 This dy-
namic can be illustrated by one commentator’s description: 
Within the Latino community, Latinas’ identities are defined 
on the basis of their roles as mothers and wives. By encourag-
ing definitions of Latinas as interconnected with and depend-
ent upon status within a family unit structure, the Latino pa-
triarchy denies Latinas individuality on the basis of gender. 
For Latinas, cultural norms and myths of national origin in-
tersect with these patriarchal notions of a woman’s role and 
identity. The result is an internal community-defined role, 
modified by external male-centered paradigms.60 
These cultural norms, even without considering the possibility of de-
portation, can make women increasingly reluctant to report violence.61 
In a survey of battered Latina immigrant women, 48.2% chose to stay 
with their abusers in fear of losing their children, 41.2% did not want to 
separate their children from their father, 18.8% cited the perception 
that a good wife and mother does not leave her family, and 18.8% 
would not leave for religious reasons.62 Each of these cultural norms 
about the role of a woman as a wife and mother create a barrier be-
tween battered women and the assistance they need.63 
3. The Language Barrier 
 Battered women may also be unable to seek help from abusive re-
lationships when a language barrier hinders effective communication 
with law enforcement officers.64 When an officer cannot understand 
                                                                                                                      
 
59 Orloff et al., supra note 35, at 82; Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas by La-
tino Males: An Analysis of Race, National Origin, and Gender Differentials, 14 B.C. Third 
World L.J. 231, 240–41 (1994); Wood, supra note 10, at 151. 
60 Rivera, supra note 59, at 241; accord Wood, supra note 10, at 151–52. 
61 See Orloff et al., supra note 35, at 82; Wood, supra note 10, at 151–52. 
62 Orloff et al., supra note 35, at 82 (citing Dutton et al., supra note 12, at 245 (discuss-
ing a study conducted from 1992 to 1995)). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 75; Wood, supra note 10, at 150. Foreign languages are often spoken at home, 
and one study on Asian-American immigrant communities indicates that over seventy-five 
percent speak their native language at home. Wang, supra note 16, at 164. A 1993 book, 
commissioned by the Social Science Research Council’s National Committee for Research 
on the 1980 Census, reports that 79.5% of Chinese immigrants, 63.8% of Filipino immi-
grants, 76.8% of Korean immigrants, 60.1% of Asian Indian immigrants, and 83.4% of 
Vietnamese immigrants speak their native language at home. Herbert R. Barringer et 
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the victim and either ignores or fails to resolve her underlying issue, 
she may be less likely to seek help in the future.65 A language barrier 
prevents police from effectively protecting the entire community.66 
This creates a danger of marginalizing entire immigrant populations.67 
For example, according to one study, seventy-two percent of foreign-
born Latinos in the United States consider Spanish their dominant 
language, while only twenty-four percent consider themselves bilin-
gual.68 Additionally, fifty-five percent of foreign-born Latinos have less 
than a high school education, thereby making communication of com-
plex legal procedures even more difficult.69 
                                                                                                                     
 Likewise, law enforcement agencies do not always have bilingual 
staff sufficient to serve those lacking proficiency in English—especially 
outside of large metropolitan areas.70 Therefore, when police cannot 
communicate with domestic violence victims, they may instead interview 
others at the scene.71 Without direct communication with the victim, 
however, officers will likely be confronted with the cultural barriers that 
cause witnesses to downplay or deny abuse.72 Law enforcement efficacy 
further deteriorates when only the abuser speaks English, as he is not 
likely to incriminate himself.73 Furthermore, if the police do not arrest 
the abuser, he may retaliate against the victim after the police leave.74 
 For example, one survey of Latino domestic violence victims re-
ported that in nearly one third of domestic violence police responses, 
officers did not speak directly to the victim.75 Furthermore, eleven per-
cent of respondents indicated that police only spoke to the abuser, and 
thirty-four percent said an officer spoke to them in Spanish.76 Overall, 
less than one quarter of respondents could communicate in English 
 
al., Asians and Pacific Islanders in the United States 187 (1995); Wang, supra note 
16, at 164. 
65 Orloff et al., supra note 35, at 75. 
66 Id.; Carlberg, supra note 19, at 742; see, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 31, at 170; infra 
notes 87-110. 
67 See Orloff et al., supra note 35, at 75. 
68 Wood, supra note 10, at 150–51. 
69 See id. at 151. 
70 Id. 
71 See Orloff et al., supra note 35, at 90–91. 
72 See id. 
73 See id. at 54 n.51. 
74 See id. 
75 Id. at 90–91. The survey was a large-scale research project conducted from 1992 to 
1995 and participants were immigrant Latinas in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. 
Id. (citing Dutton et al., supra note 12, at 245 (discussing the study conducted from 1992 to 
1995)). 
76 Orloff et al., supra note 35, at 90–91. 
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and over twenty-five percent stayed with their abusers because of their 
inability to speak English.77 These results are not unique to the Latino 
community and are likely attributable to the language barrier between 
victims and police officers, too few of whom are bilingual.78 
 This communication hindrance can lead to the police arresting 
the victim instead of the abuser.79 For example, an Asian immigrant 
named Ling called the police when her husband attacked her with a 
chair.80 She used a fish knife to defend herself and her husband cut 
himself on the knife while attacking her—when the police arrived, 
Ling’s husband accused her of attacking him.81 He spoke English well 
but she did not, and the language barrier ultimately resulted in the po-
lice arresting Ling instead of her attacker.82 In these situations, the lan-
guage barrier is even more harmful to the victim because the police 
may be more likely to believe the party with more proficiency in the 
English language.83 
 Language barriers also negatively affect immigrant domestic vio-
lence victims when they seek social services or legal protection.84 Victim 
advocates may not be able to effectively convey concepts of confidenti-
ality or even indicate what services are available to domestic violence 
victims.85 The resulting feeling of hopelessness, coupled with a fear of 
                                                                                                                      
77 Id. at 82–83. In the survey, 93.8% of the battered immigrant women requesting po-
lice assistance experienced “severe physical abuse.” Id. at 71. Additionally, all respondents 
reported injury at the time of the call and nearly sixty percent had visible injuries when 
police arrived. Id. Over half reported physical evidence of domestic violence present on 
the crime scene—property in disarray, torn clothing, and violence or threats of abuse in 
the presence of police. Id. 
78 See id. at 74, 90–91 (“The need for bilingual police officers and/or interpreters 
working with police forces in communities with significant immigrant populations has long 
been recognized.”); Wang, supra note 16, at 164; supra note 64. 
79 Wang, supra note 16, at 165. 
80 Id. at 162. 
81 Margaretta Wan Ling Lin & Cheng Imm Tan, Holding Up More Than Half the Heavens: 
Domestic Violence in Our Communities, A Call for Justice, in The State of Asian America: Ac-
tivism and Resistance in the 1990s, at 321, 327 (Karin Aguilar-San Juan ed., 1994); 
Wang, supra note 16, at 162, 164–65. 
82  Lin & Tan, supra note 81, at 327; Wang, supra note 16, at 162–63. 
83 See Wang, supra note 16, at 164–65; see, e.g., Lin & Tan, supra note 81, at 323. 
84 See Orloff et al., supra note 35, at 71. 
85 See Wood, supra note 10, at 151. Furthermore, the myriad public and private agen-
cies devoted to helping victims of domestic violence can be so daunting that a woman may 
decide to not bother contacting each organization because, by contacting multiple agen-
cies for different services, she could potentially reveal her immigration status to multiple 
people. See Orloff et al., supra note 35, at 90–91. Examples of public and private domestic 
abuse victim advocacy agencies include medical facilities, counseling centers, shelters, and 
hotlines. Wang, supra note 16, at 165. 
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revealing illegal immigration status, creates an atmosphere where vic-
tims are unlikely to seek help.86 
B. The Relationship Between Undocumented Immigrants and Law Enforcement 
 These social, cultural, and language barriers make it especially im-
portant that immigrant victims of domestic violence have trust in local 
law enforcement.87 Cultural notions of authority and fear of deporta-
tion may weaken the relationship between law enforcement officers 
and the community they police.88 Conversely, certain law enforcement 
initiatives, such as community policing and noncooperation policies, 
may strengthen the relationship.89 
1. A Weakened Relationship Between Police and the Community 
 Some refugees and other recent immigrants may distrust U.S. law 
enforcement officers by equating them with the corruption, brutality, 
and insensitivity of police in their native countries.90 For example, Mex-
ico, the former home of many U.S. immigrants, ranked 72nd out of 180 
in the 2008 Corruption Perception Index.91 One survey shows that four 
out of five Mexicans believe police are generally corrupt and take ad-
                                                                                                                      
86 Wang, supra note 16, at 165. 
87 Orloff et al., supra note 35, at 46–47; Wang, supra note 16, at 172–73; see, e.g., Men-
delson, supra note 31, at 170. 
88 Orloff et al., supra note 35, at 46–47; Wang, supra note 16, at 172–73; see, e.g., Men-
delson, supra note 31, at 170. 
89 See Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 90 Calif. L. 
Rev. 1513, 1513 (2002); Orloff et al., supra note 35, at 85; Carlberg, supra note 19, at 742. 
90 Ki-Taek Chung & Nadja Zalokar, U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Civil Rights 
Issues Facing Asian Americans in the 1990s 53 (1992), available at http://www.eric.ed. 
gov/PDFS/ED343979.pdf; Police Exec. Research Forum, Community Policing: The 
Past, Present, and Future 134 (Lorie Fridell & Mary Ann Wycoff, eds., 2004), available at 
http://www.policeforum.org/library/community-policing/CommunityPolicingReduced. 
pdf; Orloff et al., supra note 35, at 47. United States law enforcement officers, too, are not 
always trustworthy: in 1991, New York City traffic police severely beat a Chinese immigrant 
because he misunderstood a request for his registration and got out of his car. Chung & 
Zalokar, supra, at 53. Police insensitivity also took root in 1989 in a small California town 
through “a general pattern of harassment of Filipino” youth, where officers frequently 
searched their car trunks and asked them if they were members of gangs. Id. at 54. 
91 Luz E. Nagle, Corruption of Politicians, Law Enforcement, and the Judiciary in Mexico and 
Complicity Across the Border, 21 Small Wars & Insurgencies 95, 97 (2010). Mexico was 
given a “weak” rating in 2007 by Global Integrity, a non-profit organization that tracks cor-
ruption trends. See Global Integrity Report: Mexico: 2007, Global Integrity, http://report. 
globalintegrity.org/Mexico/2007 (last visited Oct. 27, 2011). In 2009, Mexico’s Global 
Integrity rating rose to the level of “moderate.” Global Integrity Report: Mexico: 2009, Global 
Integrity, http://report.globalintegrity.org/Mexico/2009 (last visited Oct.. 27, 2011). 
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vantage of citizens.92 Also, many Mexican parents teach their children 
not to trust the police, and television programs in Mexico portray po-
lice “as corrupt and incompetent oafs or sinister antagonists.”93 In cases 
where the victims are women and children, such as domestic violence, 
Mexicans generally believe authorities are more willing to protect per-
petrators than victims.94 
 These perceptions of law enforcement may stay with immigrants as 
they enter the United States, especially the undocumented immigrants 
who may already be distrustful from fear of deportation.95 Those un-
documented immigrants predisposed to alienation may further distrust 
law enforcement officers who openly collaborate with federal immigra-
tion enforcement agencies.96 Undocumented immigrants are unlikely 
to cooperate in criminal investigations or report crimes if they believe 
doing so would subject them to deportation.97 The end result may be 
to undermine community safety through the added difficulty in charg-
ing criminals or obtaining convictions.98 Therefore, communities are 
best served by encouraging communication between undocumented 
immigrants and local law enforcement officers.99 
                                                                                                                     
2. Strengthening Relationships Between Police and the Community 
 Local governments have tried to increase communication and 
trust between immigrant communities and law enforcement by enact-
ing noncooperation policies.100 These policies limit the local govern-
ment’s relationship with federal law enforcement, usually by ensuring 
that local law enforcement agents do not inquire into immigration 
 
92 See Nagel, supra note 91, at 99. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 100. 
95 See, e.g., Idilbi, supra note 10, at 1731; Nagle, supra note 91, at 99; Wang, supra note 
16, at 173. For example, one undocumented woman spent eight years living in fear of de-
portation and would not even leave her own house lest she be arrested and deported. 
Mendelson, supra note 31, at 170. For that reason, she did not call the police when her 
husband violently abused her. Mendelson, supra note 31, at 170. 
96 See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 31, at 170. 
97 Carlberg, supra note 19, at 741, 749; see, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 31, at 170. 
98 Carlberg, supra note 19, at 741–42; see, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 31, at 170. Do-
mestic violence can increase in frequency and severity over time, making it especially im-
portant that law enforcement officials and courts respond forcefully after an initial inci-
dent. See Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles 
of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 Yale J.L. & Feminism 3, 7 (1999); Julia Weber, 
Domestic Violence Courts: Components and Considerations, 2 J. Center for Families, Child. & 
Courts 23, 24 (2000). 
99 Carlberg, supra note 19, at 741–42. 
100 Id. at 742. 
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status or withholding immigration information from federal authori-
ties.101 Some such policies, however, have been preempted by federal 
statute, making some cooperation with federal enforcement officials 
compulsory.102 
 Alternatively, community policing programs are an effective way to 
strengthen the relationship between law enforcement officers and the 
community.103 Community policing often relies on traditionally mar-
ginalized groups, such as the immigrant community, to report crimes 
and other problems.104 The public helps law enforcement by looking 
                                                                                                                      
101 Id. 
In 1989, the Mayor of New York City, Edward Koch, issued Executive Order 
No. 124, which prohibited any city employee from reporting the immigration 
status of any individual to federal authorities, unless: (1) it was required by 
law, (2) the individual authorizes the immigration information to be transmit-
ted to federal authorities, or (3) the individual had been engaging in criminal 
behavior. 
Id. at 747; accord City of N.Y., Exec. Order No. 124 (Aug. 7, 1989), available at http:// 
courts.state.ny.us/library/queens/PDF_files/Orders/ord124.pdf; see also City of New York 
v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 31–32 (2d Cir. 1999). Similarly, Maine passed a noncoopera-
tion law that provides for disclosure of immigration status to federal authorities only if: 
i. the individual to whom such information pertains is suspected . . . of engag-
ing in illegal activity, other than mere status as an undocumented alien; or ii. 
the dissemination of such information is necessary to apprehend a person 
suspected of engaging in illegal activity, other than mere status as an un-
documented alien; or iii. such disclosure is necessary in furtherance of an in-
vestigation of potential terrorist activity; or iv. such disclosure is required by 
law. 
John E. Baldacci, Governor of Maine, An Order Concerning Access to State Services By All Entitled 
Maine Residents (Apr. 9, 2004), available at http://www.maine.gov/portal/government/gov- 
ernor (select the “Policy Initiatives” hyperlink, then select the “Executive Orders” hyperlink, 
then select the “Executive Order Archive” hyperlink, then select “An Order Concerning 
Access to State Services By All Entitled Maine Residents” hyperlink); Carlberg, supra note 19, 
at 752. 
102 City of New York, 179 F.3d at 36–37; Carlberg, supra note 19, at 746. In 1996, Con-
gress enacted section 434 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilia-
tion Act and section 642 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act, which were enacted to prevent localities from enacting their own noncooperation 
laws. Carlberg, supra note 19, at 746; see H.R. Rep. No. 104-725, at 383 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); 
Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate?: Local Sovereignty and the Federal Immi-
gration Power, 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1373, 1374–76 (2006). In City of New York v. United States, 
the Second Circuit explained that “the City [did] not dispute that Congress has plenary 
power to legislate on the subject of aliens.” 179 F.3d at 34. The City therefore challenged 
the statutes on both the Tenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Consti-
tution. Id. at 34, 36. The court, however, found that the statutory interference with New 
York’s executive order was permissible and upheld the statutes. Id. at 37. 
103 See Kahan, supra note 89, at 1513; Orloff et al., supra note 35, at 85. 
104 See Kahan, supra note 89, at 1513–15. 
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for suspicious behavior, being aware of empty homes, and learning how 
to handle different emergencies.105 Programs are tailored to the needs 
of each particular community, but the underlying goal is to create a 
relationship that helps identify and stop crime and disorder.106 
 Community policing occurs incrementally by increasing a com-
munity’s trust in law enforcement.107 Law enforcement officers build 
trust not only with victims, but also with their social peers so that 
friends and family members will encourage victims to seek help.108 Lo-
cal police departments may also develop stronger relations with com-
munities by meeting with various immigrant groups to discuss their 
needs and issues.109 Because leaders of immigrant community groups 
are predominantly male, law enforcement officials may also need to 
contact women’s or domestic violence victim’s organizations in an at-
tempt to learn the needs of those communities.110 
II. Cooperation Between Federal and State Law Enforcement 
 The federal government controls immigration law in the United 
States.111 Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 
however, allows federal law enforcement to enter into agreements with 
local law enforcement to enforce federal immigration law.112 Such 
agreements have strained the relationship between undocumented 
immigrants and community police officers, especially since the imple-
mentation of the Secure Communities program.113 
                                                                                                                      
105 Understanding the Responsibilities of an Officer and the Rights of a Civilian, Community-
Policing.org, http://www.communitypolicing.org/officers-and-civilians (last visited Oct. 
27, 2011) [hereinafter Community Policing]. 
106 Suzanne Meiners, Comment, A Tale of Political Alienation of Our Youth: An Examina-
tion of the Potential Threats on Democracy Posed by Incomplete “Community Policing” Programs, 7 
U.C. Davis J. Juv. L. & Pol'y 161, 170 (2003); Community Policing, supra note 105. 
107 See Orloff et al., supra note 35, at 85. 
108 Id. at 85–86. 
109 Id. at 85. 
110 See id. 
111 Yule Kim, The Limits of State and Local Immigration Enforcement and Regulation, 3 Al-
bany Gov’t L. Rev. 242, 244 (2010); see Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 
(1893); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 
92 U.S. 259, 270 (1875). 
112 Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(g), Public Law No. 82-414, 8 U.S.C. § 1357 
(2006); Kim, supra note 111, at 251. 
113 See Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudica-
tion of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 Duke L.J. 1563, 1584–85; see, e.g., Morgan John-
son, New Police Chief Named After Immigration Policy Dispute, Brown Daily Herald, Mar. 10, 
2011, at 12 (quoting Providence, Rhode Island Public Safety Commissioner Steven Pare in 
discussing the implementation of the Secure Communities program in Providence). 
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A. History of Cooperation Between Federal and Local Law Enforcement 
 Immigration in the United States is controlled by the federal gov-
ernment and, as the Supreme Court has recognized, regulation of im-
migration is “‘unquestionably exclusively a federal power.’”114 There-
fore, states and localities are limited in their abilities to regulate immi-
gration matters, though they may enforce criminal provisions of federal 
immigration laws.115 Congress may, however, authorize state officers to 
enforce immigration laws.116 Congress may not compel states or com-
mandeer state officers to enforce such laws, but it can prevent states 
from refusing to share immigration information with federal authori-
es.
agreement (MOAs) with state and local law 
nfo
     
ti 117 
 Section 287(g) of INA expressly authorizes the Secretary of Home-
land Security to enter into agreements with states and localities to en-
force federal immigration law.118 These agreements must dictate the 
specific functions state or local officers are required or allowed to per-
form.119 Section 287(g) agreements are limited to investigation, arrest, 
and detention; they do not authorize removal.120 Between the enact-
ment of section 287(g) in 1996 and December of 2009, ICE “signed 
sixty-three memoranda of 
e rcement agencies.”121 
 Many of these agreements are limited in scope and only allow jail 
officials to report immigration violators to ICE.122 Others are broader, 
allowing local law enforcement officers to directly enforce immigration 
laws after a specified training period.123 Allegations surfaced, however, 
claiming that law enforcement officers were arresting immigrants solely 
                                                                                                                 
114 Kim, supra note 111, at 244 (quoting DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976)); see 
Fong
ty of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474–75 (9th Cir. 1983); Kim, supra note 
111
ers collect regarding an 
ind
igration and Nationality Act § 287(g). 
im, supra note 111, at 252. 
En-
for
ance of immi-
grat cer functions. Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 122, at 4, 17. 
 Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 705; Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 280; Henderson, 92 U.S. at 270. 
115 See Gonzales v. Ci
, at 244–45, 247–48. 
116 Kim, supra note 111, at 251. 
117 City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 32–33 (2d Cir. 1999); Gonzales, 722 
F.2d at 474–75; H.R. Rep. No. 104-725, at 383. Local governments are also restricted by 
federal statute in their discretion to use information that their offic
ividual’s immigration status. City of New York, 179 F.3d at 32–33. 
118 Kim, supra note 111, at 251; Imm
119 See K
120 Id. 
121 Chacón, supra note 113, at 1582. 
122 Id. at 1583–84; see also Memorandum of Agreement, U.S. Immigr. & Customs 
cement, at 21, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/287g_moa.pdf. 
123 Chacón, supra note 113, at 1584; Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 122, at 4. The 
sample MOA on the ICE website includes a section on training for perform
ion offi
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to initiate investigations and removal proceedings.124 In 2009, Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano re-
sponded to those allegations by announcing that law enforcement 
agencies acting pursuant to 287(g) agreements must pursue all crimi-
nal charges originally causing an immigrant’s arrest.125 
 
rdless of 
whether they are ultimately convicted.132 For example: 
                                                                 
B. Secure Communities 
 Local enforcement of federal immigration laws has strained the 
relationship between undocumented immigrants and community po-
lice officers.126 Section 287(g) agreements are one cause of this ten-
sion, but the Secure Communities program has further exacerbated 
the problem since its implementation.127 Secure Communities is a 
formal program where state and local governments sign MOAs with 
ICE, agreeing to cross-check fingerprints against a federal database in 
an attempt to identify undocumented immigrants.128 Secure Com-
munities began in 2008 under President George W. Bush, funded 
through DHS.129 Initially, the program focused on removable nonciti-
zens in prisons and jails, charging state and local officials with identi-
fying them by running fingerprint data against DHS’s immigration 
databases.130 Secure Communities soon expanded, “ma[king] the 
identification and removal of criminal aliens a top priority . . . .”131 
Although intended to identify and remove dangerous criminals, par-
ticipating agencies screen all arrested immigrants rega
                                                     
ust between the community and law enforcement—thus under-
min and risking the public safety of our capital city.” 
John pra note 113. 
cón, supra note 113, at 1595. 
 U.S. Department Homeland Security, http:// 
www
unities-2009-03-23.pdf; Secure Communities: Get the 
 
124 Id. 
125 Chacón, supra note 113, at 1584–85. 
126 See id.; Johnson, supra note 113. 
127 See Chacón, supra note 113, at 1584–85. In a letter to ICE, the Providence, Rhode Is-
land Public Safety Commissioner, Steven Pare, wrote, “The Secure Communities program 
will create fear and mistr
ing our community policing model 
son, su
128 Cha
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Testimony of David Venturella, Executive Director, Secure Communities, Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, Before the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Homeland Secu-
rity, “Priorities Enforcing Immigration Law,”
.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1239800126329.shtm (last visited Oct. 30, 2011); 
see Chacón, supra note 113, at 1595–96. 
132 Chacón, supra note 113, at 1595–96; More Questions Than Answers About the Secure 
Communities Program, Nat'l Immigr. L. Center 1, 1–2 (Mar. 2009), http://www.nilc.org/ 
immlawpolicy/LocalLaw/secure-comm
202 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 32:185 
 In December, Mesa police arrested Roberto Gonzalez-
Corona, 42, a Mexican immigrant, on a disorderly-conduct 
charge. He was booked into the Mesa jail, where his finger-
prints were run through the criminal and immigration data-
bases. 
 The checks showed that Gonzalez-Corona had been re-
moved from the United States nine times. Gonzalez-Corona 
also had numerous misdemeanor and felony convictions in 
California on charges related to drug possession and grand-
theft auto. 
 After being verified by an ICE center in Vermont, which 
can take several hours, the information was sent electronically 
through a secure law-enforcement network to ICE's field of-
fice in Phoenix. By then, Mesa police had released Gonzalez-
Corona after charging him with disorderly conduct. 
 But ICE agents tracked him down with information re-
ceived from Mesa police. ICE agents arrested him on Jan. 27. 
Gonzalez-Corona is now being held in federal custody facing 
felony charges of illegally re-entering the United States.133 
 The Secure Communities program is extensive and rapidly grow-
ing: by November 2009, ninety-five cities and counties in eleven states 
were participants.134 As of September 2011, 1595 jurisdictions in forty-
four states and territories were participants.135 Nationally, “5.6 million 
people have been screened, resulting in the deportation of more than 
21,500 immigrants convicted of major crimes, or about 26 percent of 
the 81,489 immigrants deported overall.”136 ICE plans to require every 
jurisdiction in the country to participate in the program by 2013.137 
 Several local governments have questioned the Secure Communi-
ties program’s negative impact on community relations.138 Localities 
are concerned that Secure Communities will put an extra burden on 
                                                                                                                      
Facts, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement, www.ice.gov/secure_communities/get-the-
facts.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2011). 
133 Daniel González, ICE Project Mainly Nets Low-Level Criminals, Ariz. Republic, Mar. 9, 
2011, at A1. 
134 Chacón, supra note 113, at 1596. 
135 Activated Jurisdictions, ICE Secure Communities, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure- 
communities/pdf/sc-activated.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2011). 
136 González, supra note 133. 
137 Julia Preston & Kirk Semple, U.S. Hardens Its Stance on an Immigrant Policy, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 18, 2011, at A20; see Activated Jurisdictions, supra note 135. 
138 See Shankar Vedantam, Reversals by Immigration Officials Are Sowing Mistrust, Wash. 
Post, Nov. 22, 2010, at A4. 
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local police departments that are already working with limited funds.139 
Local government officials have also questioned the program because it 
may target both legal and undocumented immigrants.140 Secure Com-
munities may negatively impact the number of immigrants reporting 
crimes or seeking medical attention, thereby endangering public 
safety.141 The association between local law enforcement and immigra-
tion officials can discourage community cooperation and undermine 
cooperative community policing programs.142 
 Immigrant advocacy groups have also criticized Secure Communi-
ties because it fails to prioritize Level 1 offenders—those convicted of 
serious drug offenses or violent crimes.143 Data supports this concern, 
as most of the immigrants who have been removed through Secure 
Communities are low-level offenders.144 Of all Secure Communities 
jurisdictions, Maricopa County, Arizona has the highest number of 
immigrants both arrested and deported.145 Sixty-six percent of Mari-
copa County deportees, however, are either low-level criminals or have 
no criminal history at all.146 Nationally, sixty percent of Secure Com-
munities deportees are low-level criminals or have no criminal his-
ry.
     
to 147 
                                                                                                                 
139 Ken Green, Denver Mayor Candidate Mejia Joins Linkhart in Opposing ‘Secure Communi-
ties,’ Examiner.com, Feb. 17, 2011, http://www.examiner.com/top-news-in-denver/denver- 
may
ews. 
com opposition-grows-against-secure-communities-immigration-program.html. 
g.” Id. Level 3 offenders are “[i]ndividuals 
who
f Level 1 crimes, while more than 100,000 had been convicted of Level 2 and 
3 cr
zalez, supra note 133. 
or-candidate-mejia-joins-linkhart-opposing-secure-communities. 
140 Gloria Pazmiño & Debralee Santos, Opposition Grows Against Secure Communities Im-
migration Program, Manhattan Times, Nov. 23, 2010, http://www.manhattantimesn
/2010/
141 Id. 
142 See Pazmiño & Santos, supra note 140; Carlberg, supra note 19, at 741–42. 
143 Pazmiño & Santos, supra note 140; Preston & Semple, supra note 137; Michele 
Waslin, The Secure Communities Program: Unanswered Questions and Continuing Concerns, Im-
migr. Pol’y Center, Nov. 2009, at 3–4, available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/ 
sites/default/files/docs/Secure_Communities_112309.pdf. Level 1 offenders are “[i]ndiv du- 
als who have been convicted of major drug offenses and violent offenses such as murder, 
manslaughter, rape, robbery, and kidnapping.” Waslin, supra, at 3. Level 2 offenders are 
“[i]ndividuals who have been convicted of minor drug offenses and property offenses such 
as burglary, larceny, fraud, and money launderin
 have been convicted of other offenses.” Id. 
144 See Preston & Semple, supra note 137. From the time of the program’s inception 
until November 2009, Secure Communities had identified over 111,000 criminal aliens in 
local custody. Waslin, supra note 143, at 4. Of those,  “more than 11,000 were charged with 
or convicted o
imes.” Id. 
145 Gon
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
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 Secure Communities has broadened far beyond its mission of 
identifying and deporting dangerous criminals.148 It may empower law 
enforcement officers to act as deportation agents by making pre-textual 
arrests just to obtain fingerprints.149 This was the case for Maria 
la
tary,” but actually only intended for one narrow provision of the pro-
gra
Bo nos, who police arrested but never prosecuted for illegally selling a 
phone card to a neighbor.150 
 Despite these criticisms, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano an-
nounced in 2010 that communities would not be able to opt-out of the 
program.151 This, however, is a departure from Napolitano’s previous 
statements that participation is optional.152 ICE planned to achieve uni-
form participation by isolating and pressuring communities that ob-
jected to the program.153 ICE initially advertised the program as “volun-
m to be voluntary.154 In April of 2010, the National Day Labor 
                                                                                                                      
148 Id.; Secure Communities: Get the Facts, supra note 132. 
 no at e pro  under increa149 Waslin, supra te 143, 4. “[T]h gram has come
 to 
sing criticism 
from
ewly Released Documents Chronicle Agency’s Deception About 
Opting p:// 
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n to opt out of the program. In fact, a jurisdic-
 
 immigrant advocates who say it also encourages police engage in unconstitutional 
racial profiling and discriminatory arrests so they can run fingerprints through the immi-
gration databases as part of Secure Communities.” González, supra note 133. 
 a ote 1150 Vedantam, supra note 1; see W slin, supra n 43, at 4. 
151 Vedantam, supra note 138; see Suzanne Gamboa, ‘Voluntary’ Immigration Program 
Not so Voluntary, MSNBC (Feb. 16, 2011 1:50:56 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/ 
41625585/ns/us_news-security; Preston & Semple, supra note 137. 
152 Vedantam, supra note 138; see Gamboa, supra note 151; Preston & Semple, supra 
note 137. In September of 2010, United States Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Na-
politano sent a letter to Zoe Lofgren, Chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Immigration, 
Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law of the House Judiciary 
Committee, stating that “[a] local law enforcement agency that does not wish to partici-
pate in the Secure Communities deployment plan must formally notify the Assistant Direc-
tor for the Secure Communities program” and that “[i]f a local law enforcement agency 
chooses not to be activated in the Secure Communities deployment plan, it will be the 
responsibility of that agency to notify its local ICE field office of suspected criminal aliens.” 
Lett no, Sec’er from Janet Napolita y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to The Honorable Zoe 
Lofgren, Chairwoman, Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., & 
Int’l Law (Sept. 7, 2010), available at http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/LocalLaw/s-
com ptm-o -out-ltrs-USDOJ-DHS-2010-09-08.pdf; accord Vedantam, supra note 138. 
153 Preston & Semple, supra note 137. One such method of pressure involves creating a 
ring around the resistant jurisdiction by bringing all nearby communities into the pro-
gram. Id. 
154 Preliminary Briefing Guide: N
-Out of “Secure Communities” Program, Center for Constitutional Rights, htt
tice.org/files/foiabrief.pdf [hereinafter Preliminary Briefing Guide]; see Secure Co
Get the Facts, supra note 132. 
A jurisdiction may choose not to receive the identifications that result from 
processing the fingerprints through DHS's biometric system that are provided 
to the local ICE field office. In the past, this option has been mischaracterized 
as a mechanism for a jurisdictio
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Organizing Network, the Center for Constitutional Rights, and the 
Immigration Justice Clinic of the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law 
filed a complaint for the release of ICE documents to clarify the scope 
and enforceability of Secure Communities.155 Then, in the fall of 2010, 
ICE clarified its compliance requirements, thereby dispelling commu-
nity perceptions that they could opt-out of sharing fingerprints.156 
 The 2010 clarification came after several months of vague and 
contradictory statements from ICE about the program.157 For example, 
in July 2010, a regional coordinator for the Secure Communities pro-
gram sent an e-mail to the New York State Division of Criminal Justice 
Services (“the Division”) that said “‘[n]o jurisdiction will be activated if 
they oppose [Secure Communities] . . .’” and that ICE would “‘do eve-
rything [it] can to work with a N.Y. law enforcement agency to satisfy its 
concerns but at the end of the day, if they are opposed, [it] won’t go 
forward.’”158 A spokesman for the Division stated several days later that 
he learned it was “‘the position of the federal government that it can 
require participation.’”159 
                                                                                                                      
tion's decision not to receive this information directly does not affect whether 
the local ICE field office in that jurisdiction will or will not take enforcement 
Secu
o. 10 
Civ.
Confusion, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 2010, at A26; Preliminary Briefing 
Guid
; Semple, supra note 156. 
val Patrick that he could prevent statewide participation in Secure 
Com
action based on those results. 
re Communities: Get the Facts, supra note 132. 
155 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, 25, Nat’l Day Laborer Org. 
Network v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 27, 2010) (N
 3488), available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/SC_Complaint_REAL_FINAL.pdf. 
156 Preston & Semple, supra note 137; Kirk Semple, Program to Have Police Spot Illegal 
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e, supra note 154. 
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Out (Feb. 16, 2011), available at http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/newly-
released-secure-communities-documents-signal-opening-local-opt-out; Preliminary Briefing 
Guide, supra note 154. This confusion was ongoing in the aftermath of the release of in-
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National Day Laborer Organizing Network, to Deval Patrick, Governor, Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts (Mar. 21, 2011), available at http://ndlon.org/pdf/patrickletter.pdf. In 
March 2011, legal advocates from the National Day Laborer Organizing Network, the Cen-
ter for Constitutional Rights, and the Cardozo Immigrant Justice Clinic advised Massachu-
setts Governor De
munities. Id. 
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 ICE then publicly announced in June 2011 that Secure Communi-
ties would be mandatory and universally implemented by 2013.160 ICE 
also acknowledged that “some of [its] past public statements led to con-
fusion about whether state and local jurisdictions can opt out of the 
program.”161 This change began through the abolition of state MOAs— 
the agreements setting forth the bounds of Secure Communities in 
each locality.162 C argaining power 
ow that police will share their biometric data with 
m
their fingerprints.166 
 s to allow for 
ade
     
ommunities therefore lost the little b
afforded by MOAs that allowed them to tailor Secure Communities to 
their needs.163 
III. A Proposed Solution for ICE 
 Secure Communities undermines protections for domestic vio-
lence victims by encouraging silence through fear of deportation.164 
Because domestic violence perpetrators often use their partners’ un-
documented status as a means of control, victims will be less likely to 
call for help if they kn
im igration enforcement.165 Undocumented women are further de-
terred from calling for help because any arrest, regardless of whether 
the charge is later dropped, may allow local law enforcement to obtain 
ICE should therefore modify Secure Communitie
quate protections of domestic violence victims in three distinct 
steps.167 First, the program should mandate delayed reporting until af-
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ing okeswoman) (emphasis omitted). 
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mun
 
 required to operate Secure Communities for any jurisdiction, today, ICE Director John 
Morton sent a letter to Governors terminating all existing Secure Communities MOAs to 
avoid further confusion.” Leslie Berestein Rojas, ICE Rescinds Secure Communities MOAs, 
Program Continues, Multi-American, Aug. 5, 2011, http://multiamerican.scpr.org/2011/ 
08/ice-rescinds-secure-co
statement of Nicole Navas, ICE sp
164 See Vedantam, supra note 1; Fact Sheet: Intersection of Domestic Violence & The Secur
ities Program, Colo. Coalition Against Domestic Violence, http://www.leg.state. co. 
us/ CLICS/CLICS2011A/commsumm.nsf/b4a3962433b52fa787256e5f00670a71/b95c4f7f94 
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167 See Orloff et al., supra note 35, at 84 (discussing the importance of communicating the 
availability of battered women’s services to immigrant populations); Tim Hoover, May OK 
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ter those arrested during domestic violence incidents are convicted.168 
Second, ICE should limit the program to sharing only those finger-
prints obtained through felony charges and misdemeanor convic-
tions.169 Finally, ICE should encourage local officials to communicate 
these changes to the public.170 
 The benefits to these changes are two-fold: protecting vulnerable 
women from violence and preserving the relationship between undocu-
mented immigrants and local police.171 The Bolanos incident, like oth-
ers, underscores how the program has departed from its alleged original 
intent of removing dangerous criminals from communities.172 ICE and 
the states should narrowly tailor Secure Communities to protect victims 
of domestic violence while still removing dangerous criminals.173 
A. ICE’s Attempt to Acknowledge the Problem 
 ICE changed Secure Communities in the summer of 2011.174 John 
Morton, the Director of ICE, sent a memorandum to Field Office Di-
rectors, Special Agents in Charge, and Chief Counsel to outline the re-
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 See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29-29-103 (West 2011); Updated: Colorado, supra note 
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. Lorenzo-Desimilian entered the country legally, but then over-
stay
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1/08/05/secure-
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addition to Bolanos, Prince George’s County Police officers arrested Florinda Faviola 
Lorenzo-Desimilian for the same crime, namely selling phone cards without a license. 
Pangilinan, supra note 4
ed her work visa. Id. 
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Agents in Charge, & All Chief Counsel, ICE ( June 17, 2011), available at http://www.ice. 
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randum]; Elise Foley, Secure Communities Agreements Canceled, Participation Still Required, 
Huffington Post (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/201
munities-update-department-of-homeland-security_n_9
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vised policy on prosecutorial discretion.175 In his memorandum, Mor-
ton sets forth a new policy regarding prosecutorial discretion in “cases 
invo vio-
lenc
eration of the Secure Communities program 
se all ap-
rop
                                                                                                                     
lving the victims and witnesses of crime, including domestic 
e . . . .”176 Morton claims: 
The vast majority of state and local law enforcement agencies 
do not generally arrest victims or witnesses of crime as part of 
an investigation. However, ICE regularly hears concerns that 
in some instances a state or local law enforcement officer may 
arrest and book multiple people at the scene of alleged do-
mestic violence. In these cases, an arrested victim or witness of 
domestic violence may be booked and fingerprinted and, 
through the op
or another ICE enforcement program, may come to the atten-
tion of ICE.177 
Morton then advises officers, agents, and attorneys “to exerci
p riate discretion on a case-by-case basis when making detention and 
enforcement decisions in the cases of victims of crime . . . .”178 
 While attempting to recognize the domestic violence issue, this 
aspirational memorandum does not ensure that immigrant victims of 
domestic violence will not be subjected to racial profiling or subsequent 
removal proceedings.179 ICE justifies Secure Communities by noting 
that the lack of discretion protects the community from racial profil-
ing.180 Because police lack discretion, many consider Secure Communi-
ties a better alternative to an Arizona-like law that allows police to 
choose whom to ask for proof of citizenship.181 Because Secure Com-
 
enerally Morton Memorandum, supra note 174. 
CHBA letter, supra note 169, at 1; Morton Memorandum, supra note 174. 
lly to 
 
175 See g
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 See 
180 See Morton Memorandum, supra note 174; Secure Communities: Get the Facts, supra 
note 132. 
181 Jefferson Dodge, Crackdown: ‘Dragnet’ May Fend Off Arizona-Style Immigration Law, Boul-
der Wkly., Jan. 27, 2011, http://www.boulderweekly.com/article-4298-i-support-the-states-par- 
ticipation-of-secure-comm.html; Secure Communities: Benefitting Law Enforcement Throughout the 
United States, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-
communities/pdf/lea-benefits.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) ( justifying the Secure Com-
munities program because it gives police less discretion, thereby reducing the possibility of 
racial profiling). Arizona’s immigration program, S.B. 1070, became law in 2010. David A. 
Selden et al., Placing S.B. 1070 And Racial Profiling into Context, and What S.B. 1070 Reveals 
About the Legislative Process in Arizona, 43 Ariz. St. L.J. 523, 526 (2011). The law requires 
police officers who have a reasonable suspicion that someone is in the country illega
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munities applies to all fingerprints, the police do not have to decide 
who might be an undocumented immigrant and unfair implementa-
tion is a non-issue.182 ICE’s memorandum, however, contradicts its at-
tempt to be fair, instead using prosecutorial discretion as protection 
from racial profiling and pretextual arrests.183 ICE should therefore 
establish clear guidance to fully protect victims of domestic violence 
because, without it, “prosecutorial discretion” may further enable pre-
textu
work with states and localities to implement a public relations cam-
al arrests.184 
B. A Three-Step Process to Protecting Victims of Domestic Violence and 
Increasing Community Safety 
 Discretion alone will likely not solve the problem of pretextual ar-
rests that prevent abused women from calling for help.185 Instead, ICE 
should implement three specific changes to protect victims of domestic 
violence.186 First, ICE should modify Secure Communities to specify 
that reporting of arrestees pursuant to domestic violence incidents is 
not required until conviction.187 Second, ICE should limit the program 
to felony charges and misdemeanor convictions.188 Third, ICE should 
                                                                                                                      
stop
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Facts, supra note 132 (“Under Secure Communities, the fingerprints of every single 
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186 See Orloff et al., supra note 35, at 84; Hoover, supra note
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188 See Hoover, supra note 167; CHBA letter, supra note 169. 
210 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 32:185 
paign that communicates these changes.189 This final step would ensure 
that all residents—documented and undocumented—understand the 
program’s scope and that they can contact law enforcement without 
ar 
rime 
d 
                                                                                                                     
fe of deportation.190 
 Colorado’s former MOA had already implemented a framework 
similar to this first step, specifying that reporting is not required until 
conviction for those arrested as a result of a domestic violence inci-
dent.191 It did this by specifically referencing Colorado statutory lan-
guage that mirrored this first step.192 Furthermore, Colorado’s MOA 
stated that “ICE offers protection and assistance to victims of trafficking 
and violence, regardless of their immigration status. This protection or 
assistance applies to those who might have been arrested for a c
an subsequently determined to be a victim, not a perpetrator.”193 
 ICE should implement this first step because, as it already ac-
knowledges, police sometimes arrest both domestic violence victims 
and perpetrators.194 Because Secure Communities requires local police 
to send all fingerprint data to ICE before conviction, those victims who 
are arrested but not charged or prosecuted still face the risk of deporta-
 
189 See Kahan, supra note 89, at 1525 (explaining that trust in law enforcement depends 
on 
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blicizing the ill effects of Secure Communities on domestic violence victims). 
190 See Kahan, supra note 89, at 1525; Orloff et al., supra note 35, at 84–85; Carlberg, 
supra note 19, at 755; see, e.g., Vedantam, supra note 1. 
191 See Memorandum of Agreement between 
ustoms Enforcement and Colo. Dep’t of Public Safety 3 ( Jan. 6, 2011), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities-moa/colorado-sc-moa.pdf [hereinafter 
Colorado MOA]; Updated: Colora
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llowing is Colorado’s statute regarding reporting when the arrestee is charged
estic violence offense: 
(I) A peace officer who has probable cause that an arrestee for a criminal of-
fense is not legally present in the United States shall report such arrestee to 
the United States immigration and customs enforcement office if the arrestee 
is not held at a detention facility. If the arreste
and the county sheriff reasonably believes that the arrestee is not legally pre-
sent in the United States, the sheriff shall report such arrestee to the federal 
immigration and customs enforcement office. 
(II) This subsection (2) shall not a
suspected act of domestic violence 
until such time as the arrestee is convicted of a domestic violence offense. 
o. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29-29-103(2)(a). 
193 Colorado MOA, supra note 191, at 3. 
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tion.
ies to its original purpose while protecting 
nd
 
e 
mmigrants no longer fear calling the police, they may 
 m
195 A decisive policy against reporting fingerprint data before con-
viction, however, may protect domestic violence victims.196 
 Then, ICE should implement the second step of limiting the pro-
gram to felony charges and misdemeanor convictions.197 This step 
would prevent situations like that of Maria Bolanos—charged but never 
tried for selling phone cards without a license.198 Doing this would act 
to return Secure Communit
u ocumented women who call for help from being charged pretextu-
ally with a misdemeanor.199 
 The Colorado Hispanic Bar Association (CHBA) detailed its con-
cerns about Secure Communities’s implementation in Colorado.200 
Though targeted at Colorado, these concerns may be applicable to 
other communities, and addressing them may in turn help prioritize 
the targeting of dangerous criminals while protecting more victims.201 
CHBA criticized the ability of law enforcement officials to make pretex-
tual arrests solely to obtain fingerprints that are then checked against
th federal immigration database.202 The Bolanos case arguably gives 
credibility to these concerns, as her arrest may have been pretextual.203 
 Restricting Secure Communities to felony charges and misde-
meanor convictions may also help strengthen community policing pro-
grams.204 When i
be ore willing to communicate with police about crimes to which they 
are witnesses.205 
 Modifying Secure Communities, however, may not be enough if 
victims do not know they can call the police without fear of that call 
leading to deportation.206 Therefore, ICE should implement the third 
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step of working with state and local authorities to communicate these 
changes to the immigrant communities.207 Communication would help 
ensure that residents understand how the program is implemented and 
that they may contact law enforcement without fear of deportation.208 
Without this, undocumented residents may continue to be cautious and 
esi
partments should educate the public that domestic violence is 
 among violent criminals and 
drug dealers.216 Limiting the scope of Secure Communities would likely 
     
h tant to contact law enforcement.209 This phenomenon of hesitance 
already occurs in communities with unpublicized noncooperation 
agreements that limit communication with federal law enforcement.210 
 An effective communication campaign would ensure that victims 
can find resources in their native languages so as to mitigate the effect 
of language barriers.211 In addition to communicating these changes, 
police de
a crime.212 This may also help alleviate some of the social and cultural 
pressure women face and make them more comfortable with seeking 
help.213 
 Proponents of Secure Communities might argue that its scope is 
irrelevant and that undocumented immigrants should be deported re-
gardless of their crime’s severity.214 A narrow scope for the program, 
however, gives it legitimacy and community support.215 Immigrants and 
non-immigrants alike do not wish to live
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sharpen its focus and effecti y removing those criminals 
at 
nd these difficulties by preventing women from seeking assis-
nc
ting until conviction for 
domestic violence arrestees; limiting the program to felony charges and 
misdemeanor convictions; and working with states and localities to no-
tify immigrant communities of these changes. 
                                                                                                                     
veness, thereb
th no community wants in its midst.217 
Conclusion 
 Domestic violence perpetrated against undocumented women is a 
pervasive problem. Many undocumented victims of domestic violence 
indicate that fear of immigration authorities is their primary reason for 
remaining in abusive relationships. Language and cultural barriers only 
compou
ta e outside the home. Trust in local law enforcement facilitates solv-
ing the problem of domestic violence against undocumented immi-
grants. 
 These severe problems illustrate a need for change in the way ICE 
operates the Secure Communities program. There have been many 
documented instances of abuse of Secure Communities, especially as it 
affects victims of domestic violence. Therefore, ICE should implement 
a three-step reform: requiring delay of repor
 
217 See Chacón, supra note 113, at 1596; Secure Communities: A Modernized Approach to 
Identifying and Removing Criminal Aliens, supra note 216. But see CHBA Letter, supra note 
169. 
